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Form Follows Function:
Addressing the Substantive Shortcomings 
of EMU
Current Reform Debate
 European Finance Minister
– Merging the Eurogroup president and president of the ESM Board of 
Governors with the Vice-President of the COM
 European Monetary Fund
– Transforming the ESM into an EMF
 Eurozone Budget
 Eurozone Parliament
Current Reform Debate
“Whether it be the sweeping eagle in his flight, or the open apple-
blossom, the toiling work-horse, the blithe swan, the branching 
oak, the winding stream at its base, the drifting clouds, over all the 
coursing sun, form ever follows function, and this is the law. 
Where function does not change, form does not change. The 
granite rocks, the ever-brooding hills, remain for ages; the lightning 
lives, comes into shape, and dies, in a twinkling.”
Louis H. Sullivan, ‘The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered’, Lippincott’s Magazine (March 1896), 403.
Function of EMU
Function of EMU
 Article 119 TFEU
For the purposes set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union, the activities of the Member 
States and the Union shall include, as provided in the Treaties, the adoption of an economic policy 
which is based on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies, on the internal 
market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition.
Concurrently with the foregoing, and as provided in the Treaties and in accordance with the 
procedures set out therein, these activities shall include a single currency, the euro, and the 
definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy the primary objective 
of both of which shall be to maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this objective, to 
support the general economic policies in the Union, in accordance with the principle of an open 
market economy with free competition.
Function of EMU
 EMU complements the internal market
– Internal market is a customs union, in which tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions on goods and services are prohibited (free trade area), 
persons and capital can freely move (common market) and 
standards in clearly defined policy areas are harmonised in 
accordance with legislative procedures.
– Economic consequences in theory: Specialisation of national 
economies on the most competitive production of goods and services 
and free movement of labour and/or capital that is redundant to those 
national economies, in which labour and/or capital is scarce with an 
overall increase in welfare of the internal market due to trade.
Function of EMU
 EMU complements the internal market
– Economic consequences in practice: 
• Bigger national economies: Reduction of cost-increasing barriers within the 
internal market for competitive products and services stemming from bigger 
diversified national economies with production chains (Germany, France, Italy)
• Smaller less diversified national economies: Specialisation on ‘comparative 
advantages’ that allow for a fast growth: 
– ‘Bubblish’ economic activities: Financial services (Ireland, Cyprus) and construction (Spain) 
– Competition on lower social and environmental standards for the production of goods 
and services (CEE)
• Free movement of labour does not work and is even impeded by EU law (e.g. 
discrimination in relation to access to social benefits under the citizenship 
directive)
Function of EMU
 EMU creates a single currency
– Single currency entails a supranationalised definition and conduct of 
monetary policy.
– Monetary policy instruments are no longer available to compensate 
for economic over- or underperformance of single national economies
• Macroeconomic imbalances cannot be balanced with means of nominal 
devaluation or revaluation but only with means of real devaluation or 
revaluation (i.e. increase/decrease of wages)
• Wages are inflexible downwards with an increased unemployment as a 
consequence
Function of EMU
 EMU sets limits to public budgets
– Avoiding excessive deficits
• TFEU: not more than 3% of GDP (excessive deficit)
• SGP: not more than 1% of GDP (medium-term budgetary objective)
• Fiscal Compact: not more than 0.5% of GDP
– Refinancing of national public budgets on private markets 
• no monetary financing (Article 123 TFEU)
• no automatic financial assistance by EU or other Member States (Article 125 TFEU)
• full risk exposure to financial market operators
• subject to ‘market discipline’ understood in a purely formal manner
Function of EMU
 Wrapping up
– Challenges for national policies in the internal market
• Structural: Setting up the infrastructure to modernise national economies in order 
to keep up in the free competition of the internal market
• Standard-setting: Implementing EU standards
– Challenges for national policies in the monetary union
• Preparing for overreaction on financial markets with non-monetary policy means
• Establishing mechanisms to address adjustments in the real economy (labour 
market policy and unemployment benefits scheme)
• Establishing a fiscal capacity for times of declining private demand 
– Challenges for national policies under the budget control
• Sound budgets irrespective of the state of the national economy (procyclical)
Function of EMU
 Corner stones of EMU
Economic 
Policy 
Coordination
Supranational 
monetary 
policy
Sound 
budgets: 3% 
of deficit and 
60% of debt
Internal 
market with 
open borders
Function of EMU
 EMU establishes the coordination of national economic policies
– Economic policies of sovereign states that are bound to each in the 
internal market and the monetary union impact each other
– EU legal framework for the conduct of national economic policies
• Pre-emption when covered by exclusive Union competences (Article 2(1) 
TFEU) or shared competences that were exercised by the Union (Article 2(2) 
TFEU)
• Limitations set by fundamental freedoms, free movement of citizens and 
competition law
• Supported by Cohesion funds and investment activities of the EIB
– Coordination without enforcement
Function of EMU
 Function of economic policy coordination in EMU
– before the crisis: ensuring budgetary discipline
• by means of sanctioning the non-achievement of nominal targets
– after the crisis: 
• ensuring sound public budgets
– by means of sanctioning the non-achievement of nominal targets
– by protecting private refinancing of states against market overreactions
• and addressing the conflicting demands of EU law in the economic policy 
coordination
– Solving the sound budgets and shock-absorber dilemma
– Solving the competitiveness and resilient national economies dilemma 
– Not solving these dilemmata will lead to economic and social divergence
Function of EMU
 Addressing the issue of market overreaction
– Either: States remain exposed to market overreaction
– Or: Establishing an instrument at central level that eliminates ‘noise’ on 
the financial markets
• Mutualisation of debt (e.g. Eurobonds)
• Pooling of debt (e.g. Sovereign Bond-backed Securities (SBBS))
• Tranching common issuance (e.g. Accountability Bonds, Eurobills)
– Restoring market access: the problem of legacy debt
• European Redemption Fund
Function of EMU
 Addressing the sound budgets and shock-absorber dilemma
– Either: Attenuating the budgetary objectives
– Or: Establishing EU financed fiscal capacity to kick in in the event of a 
crisis
• Automatic stabilisers: Reinsurance of national unemployment benefits 
schemes
• Keeping up investments: Investment protection
• Fiscal policy: Public financial means to replace declining private demand
Function of EMU
 Addressing the internal market and long-term adjustment costs 
dilemma
– Objective: Structural changes in order to achieve sustainable 
economies instead of short-term growth (economic and social 
convergence)
– Either: Allowing weaker national economies to close borders
– Or: Economic policy coordination that includes capacity-building
• Convergence instrument (funding for structural reforms, ‘Convergence Code’)
– And: Establishing additional financial means for structural funds to 
attenuate costs of structural adjustments
• Expanding Cohesion Funds significantly
Function of EMU
 Summary: Functions of EMU after the crisis
 Ensure sound public budgets in order to prevent refinancing crises 
 Shield Member States against market overreaction when refinancing 
public budgets on private financial markets
 Assist Member States when access to financial markets is closed
 Enable Member States to compensate the lack of monetary policy 
instruments with means of fiscal policy 
 Streamline Member States’ economic policies in order to prevent 
negative spill-over effects on other national economies within EU
 Set incentives for Member States’ economic policies to remedy 
‘internal market in practice’ (economic and social convergence)
Form of EMU
Form of EMU
 If no change in function …
– … no change in form is needed except for …
– closing the accountability gap:
• ECB: Independence guarantee, Article 130 TFEU
• ESM: Intergovernmental body, which is, in principle, ex post accountable, via the 
national finance ministers, to national Parliaments (of the creditor countries)
• COM: still covered by the EU law framework (‘Pringle’) but this framework refers 
to the chapter on economic policy coordination, in which the COM is to be 
held account by the Council (no ordinary legislative procedures)
– by including the ESM into EU law making it subject to the CJEU;
– by merging the president of Eurogroup/ESM and the VP of the COM;
– by strengthening the European Parliament (at least).
Form of EMU
 If change in function …
– … change in form can be discussed in terms of:
• Eurozone budget to finance additional financial instruments such as a 
convergence instrument or EUBS
– which is financed by own resources (part of national taxes (VAT), own EU tax not possible)
– which is financed by extra contributions from EZ countries earmarked for EZ expenses 
(enhanced cooperation in budget law is possible)
• EMF that includes ex ante capacity-building 
• European Finance minister that is accountable 
– for the use of the EZ budget
– for the management of the ‘European Safe Asset’
– for the management of the EMF, economic policy coordination and budgetary control
• double-hat Parliamentary accountability (instead of EZ Parliamentary assembly)
Conclusions
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